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Historically (i.e., Biblically), îÄùÑôÌÈèÄéí were the litigated, case law, product of ùÑåÉôÀèÄéí in a Beit-Din, who adjudicated questions and disputes (in contrast with legislating khuq•imꞋ) in the implementation of Tor•âhꞋ in real life disputes, applications and cases.
In modern parlance, as a byproduct of the split between Ultra-Orthodox "halakhic" or "religious" courts (having wrested control from moderate Orthodox) versus an Israeli state, "secular," court, the term îÄùÑôÌÈè was narrowed to include only Israeli "secular" state courts; i.e., a court trial or hearing, litigation in a court that is not Ultra-Orthodox ("religious"). Ultra-Orthodox ("religious") courts then distinguished themselves as a Beit Din, judging according to din Tor•âhꞋ rather than state (îÄùÑôÌÈè) law, to differentiate it from a "secular" (Israeli state) beit mi•shᵊpâtꞋ.
& Stare DecisisAccording to legal principles still revered in courtrooms today, these îÄùÑôÌÈèÄéí constituted a First-Order res judicata in a system of law based on the principle of stare decisis. When based on solid (i.e. Ta•na"khꞋ) foundation, stare decisis is vital to ensuring consistency (equality) under the law. Failing to base stare decisis solidly on on Ta•na"khꞋ, however, logically transforms stare decisis into an ex falso quodlibet assumption – a mindless assimilation back into previous idolatry. Disastrously, stare decisis then invites everlasting mindless magnification of the earlier assimilation – amplifying idolatry – without ever reconsidering whether the original precedent was logically well-founded and that it remains logically well-founded despite mundas mutatis.
The deliberations of these cases, along with their îÄùÑôÌÈèÄéí, were transmitted orally (except for the Pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ, who codified their version, Χειρόγραφον τοῖς Δόγμασιν, by the first century C.E.) until the 5th century C.E. when Tal•mudꞋ was compiled. Much Ha•jâd•âhꞋ and rabbinic "fences" legislation found in Tal•mudꞋ, though sometimes assumed to be Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ, exceed the definition of îÄùÑôÌÈè.
) vs Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ (Written Instruction)While Tor•âhꞋ shë-bᵊ•al pëhꞋ will always be continually adapting to new technology, conditions and situations, Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ is complete (Tᵊhil•imꞋ 91:8). Contrary to some rabbinic assertions, their attempts to alter Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ are prohibited by Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ (e.g., Dᵊvâr•imꞋ 27:3,8; 31:24; 4:1-2; 13:1; Shᵊm•otꞋ 24:4; Yᵊsha•yâhꞋu 29:13 & Mi•shᵊl•eiꞋ ShᵊlomꞋoh 30:5-6).
Legitimate îÄùÑôÌÈè is either 1) "Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ dᵊ-Or•âi•tâꞋ," which always stands on direct logical authority of Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ, or 2) "Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ dᵊ-Rab•ân•ânꞋ," which is of lesser authority.
Rulings that cannot be defended directly from Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ through logical implication, relying solely on rabbinic authority, are recognized as binding by the Nᵊtzâr•imꞋ only when it can be conclusively demonstrated that
the îÄùÑôÌÈè is in no way incompatible with Tor•âhꞋ shë-bi•khᵊtâvꞋ and
the îÄùÑôÌÈè cannot be avoided through the exercise of reasonable accommodation and tolerance from both sides or parties of an issue.
The accumulated corpus of îÄùÑôÌÈè comprises Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ.
Συνέδριον, a Greek word (then used only in Hellenist circles) was known in the Jewish community as the Beit-Din ha-Jâ•dolꞋ. The corpus of Oral Law—îÄùÑôÌÈèÄéí and khuq•imꞋ of the Beit-Din—over the millennia, preserved for us by the Pᵊrush•imꞋ, is called Ha•lâkh•âhꞋ. The Qum•rânꞋ-Essene Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ called their interpretations Ma•as•ëhꞋ. The Hellenist pseudo-Tzᵊdoq•imꞋ Ko•han•eiꞋ hâ-RëshꞋa of the Beit ha-Mi•qᵊdâshꞋ ha-Shein•iꞋ codified their Oral Law into their Χειρόγραφον τοῖς Δόγμασιν.
For more details, see Atonement In the Biblical 'New Covenant' Live-LinkT (ABNC).
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